39%, and will remain above 70% in the future. The banking system as the transition and development of the state-owned economy. Out of the protection of savings deposits and the banking system, the state did not introduce the securities market into the "financing channel" prematurely, but only after the state-owned banking system was fully developed and the monopoly of the deposit certificate in financial assets was established. Development of the securities market. Although China's national debt market issued national debt in 1981, it was far from scale due to its small amount. It was only in 1988 that a secondary market was piloted and in 1991 was there a room for development of national debt. However, due to the decline of the national financial capacity and the high debt repayment density of 3-5 years of medium-term bonds, 80% of the annual issuance of national bonds is used to repay the national bonds of previous years. The "financing channel" function plays a smaller role. Enterprises only accounted for 2.2% of GNP through national financial financing. The establishment of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in December 1990 and July 1991 marked the development of the stock market. As of 1998, the cumulative total issued share capital of 234.535 billion shares, including 20.296 billion shares in A shares, 14.137 billion shares in B shares, and a market value of 574.6 billion yuan in stock circulation. The stock market has developed rapidly and has become a new "financing channel" within the system. It has its objective reasons: since the property rights system of China's stock market has not been established, the issuance of stocks is completely controlled by the state and strict administrative rationing is implemented. For a state-owned enterprise with stock issuance rights, it is equivalent to obtaining a large amount of free capital use rights. The entire stock issue is similar to the allocation of credit scale. In this way, through this "financing channel", a large amount of financial resources can be obtained within the system. Through the above rough empirical description, we can roughly outline the emergence and development of the "financing channel" in China's dual-track progressive reform, and use the following diagram to more intuitively represent this process. Legend: "Financing channel" of the dual-track system Inner system of Taimu City Department System Note: 1. Inside the system refers to the state-owned economy; outside the system includes the non-state-owned economy and residents. (Residents as fast-growing private enterprise entities and providers of some financial resources fall outside the scope of the system) 2. The solid arrows indicate the one-way process of the “financing channelâ€: outside the system to the system; the dotted arrows indicate the flow from the system to the system Loss of foreign wages and state assets. The above chart states that the “financing channel†is a financing system that gathers financial resources from outside the system and provides transition and development within the system. It includes the banking system, the bond market, and the stock market. Its flow is only one-way from outside the system to inside the system . 2. The model supported by the "financing channel" in the dual-track system In order to further illustrate the supporting role of the "financing channel" in the progressive reform of the dual-track system, it is possible to introduce the promotion of the two sectors of the financial deepening theory by Galbis. In 1973, McKinnon (RIMcldnnon) and Shaw (ESShaw) put forward the same conclusion in their respective works, that is, the financial deepening theory, collectively called the M-S model. Galbes promoted the M-S model: Suppose that there are two sectors in a country ’s developing economy, one is a backward or inefficient sector I; the other is an efficient or rapidly developing sector. In general, the country The sector will be used as the development object, so that it can be further presumed: restrict the investment of sector I and encourage its savings; and strictly prohibit the inflow of financial resources to sector I. In this way, the interest rate of deposits in the developing economy should be higher than the rate of return of capital of sector I. Meet the presumption. Moreover, the state will encourage sector investment and use the deposits of sector I for sector investment. Obviously, the investment return rate of the sector is greater than the loan interest rate, otherwise the sector will not continue to invest. If Galbers ’two-sector model is slightly modified, it can become an output model supported by the“ financing channel â€under China ’s dual-track system. First set the symbols in the model: Y, Y1, Y2 represent the output of a country's economy, out-of-system and in-system, F1, F2 represent out-of-system and in-system output functions, and K1, L1 represent out-of-system respectively. Capital and labor input, K2 and L2 represent capital and labor input in the system, respectively. Then the output functions within and outside the system are: the return on capital within and outside the system is i2 and rl, and the wage rate is respectively W2 and W1. When there is a “financing channel†to provide financial support within the system, A total output function can be expressed as: Yes) It is worth noting that China supports inefficient state-owned enterprises, that is, using high-efficiency out-of-system output subsidies to transition within the system. The government strictly defines the system as a financial self-sufficiency unit, restricting the inflow of financial resources; at the same time limiting the opportunity cost of savings certificates to ensure that most of the financial resources outside the system flow into the system, that is, the government uses state capacity to change efficient sector investment The tendency has ensured the establishment of a “financing channel†and further ensured the source of funds under inefficient conditions within the system. Analysis of the output model of the dual-track system shows that although the support of funds has been lost outside the system, in terms of the nature of its enterprises, most of them are labor-intensive township and village enterprises and private enterprises. The source of funds can be obtained through the protection of local governments. The solution of the financial sector is reflected in the model is that the advantages of W1 and L1 have made Y1 have greater development. In 1978, the out-of-system output accounted for 22.37% of industrial output and rose to 74.5% in 1998. On the other hand, although the output efficiency within the system is low, the subsidies for financial resources outside the system have basically maintained stability and development. , Reflected in the model is the advantage of K obtained through the "financing channel" to make Y2 long. However, the output within the system has dropped from 77.63% in 1978 to 25.5% in 1998. Overall, it is the growth within and outside the system that guarantees the rapid growth of China's GDP. 3. The obstruction of the "financing channel" Compared with Gailbes' two-sector model, the establishment of the "financing channel" in the output model of the dual-track system contains two conditions: First, the use of national capabilities has changed investment outside the system. Tendency; The second is to achieve a certain percentage of length within the system. The realization of these two conditions is supported by the state, because the dual-track system conforms to the state's utility function. The state cannot guarantee the long-lasting output of state-owned enterprises in the system. In this way, the financial support through the "financing channel", which is crucial to China's economic reform, has become an inefficient flow of funds, and the financing system that has completed this flow has gradually become blocked. The reason is that its one-way flow characteristics have not been able to meet the financial needs of the Chinese economy. "Financing channel" The reason for this is: the concentration of social financial resources to serve state-owned enterprises within the system. When the output of state-owned enterprises only accounts for 1/3 of the national economy, the "financing channel" is still used to inject capital, and the result will inevitably be the blocking of the "financing channel". The "blocking" of the banking system is manifested by the accumulation of huge non-performing loans and deposit gaps. For a long time, loans to state-owned enterprises in the system have been the main business of banks as "financing channels". At the end of 1998, 5 trillion of the 23.8 million state-owned enterprises ’debt of 8.3 trillion was bank loans. The use of funds within the system has also been extensive, with state-owned enterprises and many countries having low returns on investment projects. During the 19 years from 1978 to 1996, the capital profit tax rate of state-owned industrial enterprises dropped from 24.2% to 7.11%, and the capital profit rate fell from 15.5% to 0.78%. The loss amount increased from 4.206 billion yuan to 79.068 billion yuan. On the one hand, state-owned enterprises suffered losses, on the other hand, the banking system had to replace the old with the old, and continue to lend to loss-making and insolvent enterprises, resulting in a large number of non-performing loans. By 1998, non-performing loans accounted for 25% of total loans. Faced with state-owned enterprises that repeatedly owe and owe many times, banks began to consider their own profits, and a phenomenon of "reluctance to lend" appeared. However, because the opportunity cost of resident financial assets has been limited, the long-established single preference—saving deposits cannot be changed quickly, and resident deposits form a huge deposit gap in the banking system. According to the relevant data of the People's Bank of China, the deposit gap began to appear in 1994, and it was handed down year after year. By June 1999, the total deposit gap of state-owned banks had reached 990.67 billion yuan. The accumulation of huge non-performing loans and deposit gaps is a reflection of the serious congestion in the “financing channelâ€. Although the securities market has developed for a relatively short period of time, the shareholding structure of the stock market has formed a certain degree of blockage. As previously analyzed, the stock market as a "financing channel" for state-owned enterprises to obtain funds free of charge has become the focus of competition for state-owned enterprises. With the development of the stock market, a deformity of the shareholding structure has gradually formed: (1) The distribution of shareholding is relatively concentrated. The proportion is more than 40%; (2) The proportion of untradable share capital is too large, on average about 2/3, and the tradable share capital only accounts for 1/3. Obviously, the equity of Chinese listed companies has also been artificially divided into national shares , Legal person stocks, social public stocks and internal employee stocks and other series of equity are not equal parts, and account for more than 70% of the shares of listed companies and cannot be listed and circulated. The abnormality of the equity structure of the stock market partly reflects the blockage of the "financing channel", only because the stock market is becoming the focus of investment outside the system, and the blockage is temporarily masked. 4. Conversion of the “financing channel†The fundamental cause of the “blocking†of the financing channel, as analyzed above, is the long-term injection of funds into the system through the “financing channelâ€, and the state-owned enterprises in the system cannot fully absorb this part of the financial support over time. The capital flow in the “financing channel†becomes inefficient or even ineffective with the gradual decrease in output efficiency within the system, which is reflected in the bank ’s books, which is huge non-performing loans and deposits; the stock market is “ "Round money", equity deformity. Therefore, the conversion of the "financing channel" should also follow this logical sequence: starting with the one-way flow of funds in the "financing channel" and driving the role of the "financing channel", that is, from the financing server of the state-owned enterprise in the system to the financial market resources Configure mediation conversion. The problem of non-performing loans and deposits of banks can be solved by changing the role of banks. Banks have shifted from a simple state-owned enterprise "financing server" to rapidly developing out-of-system financing, through which non-system loans have been used to digest non-performing loans and deposits. But this conversion requires state support. The stock issuance market also needs to be opened to the outside of the system. Redundant state-owned shares can be optimally allocated through the stock market and absorbed by outside the system to complete the process and realize the conversion of the securities market. Of course, this also requires state support. The state-owned banking system has been the core of intra-system financing for many years. The long-term one-way flow of funds is more serious and the conversion problem is particularly difficult due to its key position in the national economy. At present, the state-owned banking system and the national macro-control agencies also recognize the need for conversion, but to serve outside the system of financing, we must consider the problems of low scale efficiency and high risks. It is precisely because of these two problems that state-owned banks The conversion work is difficult to proceed smoothly. Regarding the issue of scale efficiency, state-owned banks can be considered as holding shares when non-state-owned banks are listed, and the flexibility of non-state-owned banks can be used to provide financial services to individuals. Taking into account the fact that most individual companies in China maintain corporate liquidity in the name of individuals, this part of the market is still very broad. Regarding the high-risk issue of financing outside the system, you can consider establishing a credit guarantee system for SMEs. Regarding the credit guarantee system for SMEs, the United States, Japan, and Taiwan Province of China all have relatively sound systems that can learn from their experience. Specifically, the government participates in the SME credit guarantee system. Banks and government organizations jointly operate the SME guarantee association, absorbing funds from the government and financial institutions, and dispersing risks in accordance with the prescribed ratio. Taking into account the specific situation in China, it should also be noted that: (1) formulate relevant laws to resolve possible conflicts between state-owned banks and SMEs; (2) make full use of the policy to guide the development direction outside the system; (3) strengthen risk control and Management, establish a strict loan review management and follow-up investigation system. The conversion of the stock market is more difficult, because the conversion of the stock market requires the diversification of market property rights subjects. At present, the stock market does not have this condition. The conversion of the natural stock market should be logically followed by the state-owned banking system. In this period of time, it is necessary to realize the diversified foundation of property rights, that is, to realize the opening of the stock issuance market to outside the system. It should be said that the listing of companies outside the system has its risks, which requires the country to advance this process step by step and to properly ensure the safety of the stock market. It can be believed that the vitality and development speed of enterprises outside the system can gain a foothold in the stock market. When the diversified ownership of the stock market is established, the conversion of the stock market after the conversion of the state-owned banking system is completed, that is, the use of development outside the system to realize the conversion of the stock market from the financing server in the system to the allocation of funds in the financial market through the equity transfer. Under the guidance of the state, it is carried out quickly and effectively. Because the time left for China to join the WTO is running out, the fragile "financing channel" is difficult to withstand the impact of foreign financial institutions without reform. The treaty signed by the China-US WTO accession negotiations can basically be left to The deadline for the Chinese financial industry: In terms of banks, foreign banks can carry out RMB business two years after entering China, and can engage in retail business after five years. Geographical restrictions and customer restrictions will be removed within five years; in terms of securities, foreign securities Companies can engage in fund management, securities issuance, and foreign currency-denominated securities trading business. Joint venture fund management companies with Chinese and foreign capital can own 33% of the equity, and after 3 years to 49% of companies engaged in securities underwriting business, the equity limit is 33%. China's entry into the WTO is an external cause of China's "financing channel" mandatory system changes. It has become a very urgent matter to speed up the conversion of "financing channel". Mouth (Editor in charge: Kai Yan) Aloe Vera Gel,Nourishing Foot Mask,Peel Foot Mask,Lavender Foot Mask Guangzhou Jie Lin international trade Co., LTD , https://www.jinlintrade.com